Somalia Plan An Outline:Qalinkii Daahir Mire Jabriil
Somalia Current Situation: The country is under Al-shabab rule, except Somaliland, Puntland and parts of Mudug (Galmudug Administration) and Galgadud (Ahlu Sunah WA Jama’a) regions. The military garrisons at the port, airport and Villa Somalia under AMISOM does not have any significant political or security relevance, but instead plays a major propaganda role for Al-shabab agitation and recruitment.
Al-shabab continues a sustained military offensive against the TFG and AMISOM. The main artery road (Maka Al Mukarama) linking Aden Abdulle Osman International Airport and Villa Somalia is now a battle zone, and civilian transportation is unable to pass. The President, the Parliament and the cabinet live within only a few blocks guarded by AMISOM.
The military units trained in neighboring countries for the TFG are disintegrating because of a lack of maintenance and leadership. Most of them joined Al-shabab as an already trained fighting force.
There are two substantial elements that significantly compound this complex situation. First, TFG has neither the necessary financial means nor military force to defeat Al-Shabab, while AMISOM does not have the mandate to engage AL-Shabab outside of its garrisons in Mogadishu. Secondly, paradoxically the UN arms embargo on Somalia
prohibits arming of any Somali entity. The winners of the embargo regime are those who do not abide by it, namely Al-Shabab and associates.
The Ugandan and Burundi peace keeping force, with its restricted mandate, is only able to hold on to Mogadishu airport and port at the cost of heavy civilian casualties and displacement. They are no match for the guerilla and suicide tactics of the Al Qaeda trained and re-enforced Al-shabab fighters.
Al-shabab is increasing recruitment and training of fighters by the day. All the population centers (cities, towns, villages) in the south and central Somalia are effectively under Al-Shabab. Estimates of several hundred to several thousand foreign fighters and experts from Al-Qaeda and other radical groups enhance the ranks and the fighting quality of Al-Shabab.
Economically, in the last rainy season, Al-shabab reached another milestone. In the agriculturally fertile south Somalia, they have harvested a record amount of agricultural produce which indicates their ability to move towards self sustainability.
Now it’s obvious that the current peace keeping status of AMISOM, in three Mogadishu garrisons (the main Mogadishu Port, the Airport, and Villa Somalia), is not peace keeping, and this situation is not sustainable. The civilians are increasingly victimized. Al-shabab gets stronger by increasing the number of men in its ranks and the Ugandan and Burundian forces will be more frustrated and will act indiscriminately against the population of Mogadishu. At this time, there is no peace to keep in south-central Somalia.
What are the alternatives to this unsustainable situation?
In the current military and political situation, there could be some strategies that can make sense. Here I will outline short term security option and a comprehensive plan of action.
Short term security Option:
· Three thousand AMISOM forces could relocate to Dhusamareb (the capital of Galgadud region) where Ahlu Sunna WA Jama’a is based. That move will have two advantages: More reliable local force could be recruited, and Al-shabab fighters could be forced to fight in open terrain. AMISOM base in that area could also ease Ethiopian security concerns and military incursions and enhance the security of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, and Ahlu Sunnah WA Jama’a, who are now the only remaining outposts against Al-shabab’s total Somalia capture. A loyal and reliable force, recruited from all the regions of Midland State could be formed, and put under political and military leadership of the State.
· Another three thousand fresh AMISOM re-enforcement could take Kismaio (Lower Juba Region). Kismaio is very strategic. It has major port and airport and important gateway to southern regions. The Somali forces trained by the Kenyans and the Ethiopians could be combined with new recruits from all the regions of Southwest State.
Forces trained for States should have the discipline and the spirit needed to form backbone of future national security force. But in the short term, they have to be
· motivated and prepared to make the highest self-sacrifice to liberate their regions, towns and villages from the radical extremes.
This scenario assumes that AMISOM mandate would be changed from peace keeping to peace making and the goal is a short term tactical move. A more comprehensive strategic plan that has an effective security track, political track, and economic track must be in the works, while buying time and denying Al-shabab to take over the whole country.
A Comprehensive Plan:
Lessons learned from other countries plagued with radical and violent religious groups and torn apart by civil wars make it abundantly clear that without financial resources, fair and legitimate political structure, trained and equipped local security forces, a huge reconstruction package and the right action plan; we may not see stable, peaceful, and democratic Somalia in the near future.
Somalia’s present situation could soon devolve into a larger sub-regional and international security threat, humanitarian catastrophe and a menace to the economically vital waterways of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The religious intolerance that manifested itself in Somalia will engulf the region. Multi-national Navy’s on the Somalia coast, that do not set foot on the breeding grounds of violent extremes and pirates, may prove to be a futile exercise. In this dire circumstance, half- hearted measures will not succeed.
In the following points, I want to forward a possible comprehensive plan of action. This plan requires substantial funding and enough security forces for its implementation.
A possible comprehensive plan of action:
The US could lead the planning and the implementation of a comprehensive political, security, and economic plan of action for Somalia through the adaption of the following strategies:
1. Funding:
· Banking on the prospective oil and natural gas reserves off shore and on shore Somalia and with the help of US government, the Somalis can negotiate with US companies that already have exploration concession agreements with Somalia and are now waiting in the wings or give new concessions to other companies.
· US could use its diplomatic muscle and respected personalities like former President Bill Clinton, Colin Powell and start fundraising from oil-rich gulf governments and other potential countries.
· US government could also use some of its discretionary funds and seek congressional appropriations for Somalia.
· US government could call an immediate meeting of countries and organizations most affected by the piracy on the Red Sea and Indian Ocean and the security in Somalia at the United Nations HQ in NY, with the objective of raising significant funds.
2. Political Framework:
· The US could assist the inescapably emerging federal political structure of Somalia and accordingly support the concept of feasible four federal states:
o Somaliland,
o Puntland,
o Midland, and
o Southwest State.
· The US should lead and assist the convening of summits to create constitutions and governments for Midland State and Southwest State. These summits could be held inside or outside Somalia.
· The US should discourage and resist spending time, money and political capital on the failed concept of holding yet another national Reconciliation Conference. Ongoing political initiatives in Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya and other places could be routed to support the existing states and help the formation of new ones.
· Legitimate political representation of the complex clans, districts and regions at state and national levels can only be achieved by supporting people who want to create a viable state and local political structure and viable local administrations. Somalis are disillusioned and exhausted of people that claim political leadership without political capital, through media and foreign connections.
· The formation of Midland State and Southwest State should be completed within the time remaining for the TFG and a national constitutional convention, in which delegates mandated by the governments of the four states participate. Somalia constitution and a legitimate federal government could be formed through an agreement of the four States.
· Legitimate national politicians, with their constituent’s mandate, can emerge from the political and traditional structures in the states.
3. Security Framework
· Create Operational Zone One (Southwest State plan) under strong political and military leadership of the state. Southwest State could consist of Lower Shebelle, Bay, Bakol, Gedo, Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba.
· Create Operational Zone Two (Midland State plan), under strong political and military leadership of the state. Midland State could consist of Galgadud, Hiran, Upper Shebelle, Banadir and southeastern part of Mudug.
· Create Operational Zone Three (Somaliland and Puntland), with effective reconstruction and oil and natural gas exploration programs.
· The formation of well trained, disciplined, equipped and paid national military force could wait until the states liberate their territories and the national convention concludes its deliberations.
4. Reconstruction:
· Allocate enough funds for reconstruction, intended to create jobs for thousands of armed and otherwise unemployed youth and use them to repair and rebuild the infrastructure.
· The existing, peaceful, local administrations could be supported to build the security, political, financial and technical capacity needed to sustain and develop effective governance.
Dahir Mirreh Jibreel
Executive Leadership Fellow
Center for Integrative Leadership
Hubert H. Humphrey Institute
University of Minnesota
and
Executive Director
Somali Justice Advocacy Center